Turkey is a rapidly growing energy consumer in its own right. Turkey has experienced extremely sharp economic growth in recent years, which was largely achieved through a rapidly increasing population. Due to its demographic and economic growth, Turkey constitutes a major energy market. Domestic energy production has not exceeded half of energy demand. Crude oil remains the main energy source. In 2001, oil consumption was 0.6 million barrels per day. The share of oil is the largest, ranging from 46.3% in 1985 to 43 % in 2001. Domestic natural gas (NG) production is very small and almost all NG is imported. In 2001, NG production was around 312 million cubic meters (mcm), while imports were around 16.34 billion cubic meters (bcm). Current gas production in Turkey meets 1.9% of domestic consumption requirements. Turkey's demand for NG is estimated to rise to 55 bcm by 2010 and 83 bcm by 2020.
INTRODUCTION
Turkey is at the crossroads of several volatile, strategically and economically important regions, including the awkward triangle of the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Its size is 779,452 square kilometers. Turkey's population is 65,000,000. 56 % of the inhabitants of the country live in cities.
Since 1983, the Turkish economy has been growing very fast. Despite limitations in domestic resource availabilities, primary and secondary energy demand in Turkey is growing very rapidly, parallel with her industrialization efforts. The energy demand of Turkey will be doubled between the years 2000-2010 and will be fivefold between 2000-2025. Long-term planning studies indicate a heavy burden of investments between 1996 to 2010, amounting to some 68 billion US dollars. Turkey's funding needs for the energy sector is the highest of the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries. The needs of each energy sector are (Demirbas, 2001 ):
• Electricity: 56 billion US dollars (82 %) • Gas: 6 billion US dollars (9 %) • Oil: 4 billion US dollars (6 %) • Solid fuels: 1 billion US dollars (1 %)
One of the most important developments in the energy sector was the implementation of Built-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and BO (Built-Operate) model investments with foreign capital. And also a new arrangement foreseeing the implementation of BO model is under evaluation.
Turkey's energy demand is growing at a rate of 8% per year (Demirbas, 2002a; Demirbas, 2002b) . Table 1 shows sectoral distribution of the general energy demand. Thus, the country has to import more than 52 % of the energy requirement supplied by imports to recover the gap between the consumption and demand. The share of imports is expected to increase 62% in 2020 (Demirbas and Bakış, 2003) . Total  1995  18181  17475  10827  2790  1514  50787  1997  22779  21374  12209  3120  158  61040  1999  26576  23021  13521  3483  1604  68205  2001  30815  24708  14842  3868  1651  75883  2003  35491  26414  16146  4273  1699  84024  2005  40764  28239  17564  4721  1749  93037  2007  46863  30125  19122  5148  1800 103068  2010  57493  33193  21722  5862  1880 120150 Source: Demirbas, 2001; WECTNC, 1996 Turkey's total primary energy production meets about 48% of the total primary energy demand (Demirbas and Bakış, 2003) . In 2020, indigenous primary energy production is expected to be 26% (Oǧulata, 2003; Demirbas and Bakış, 2003 ). Turkey's energy consumption in 2000 was 82.2 million tons of oil equivalents (Mtoe). It is expected to reach 179 Mtoe by 2010, and 319 Mtoe by 2020 (MFA, 2003) . Indigenous energy production to meet the energy demand is expected to be 33% in 2005 , 30% in 2010 and 26% in 2020 (WECTNC, 1997 .
In Turkey lignite has the biggest share in total primary energy production by 43 percent (Demirbas, 2002b) . Nearly 75% of the indigenous lignite is consumed in thermal power plants (Oǧulata, 2003) .
TURKEY'S OIL DEMAND
Turkey's economy is projected to grow by 4 percent per year, and its demand for oil is projected to grow by 3.1 percent per year, from 0.6 million barrels per day in 2001 to 1.3 million barrels per day in 2025 (EIA, 2003) .
Oil provides around 43% of Turkey's total energy requirements, but its share is declining (as the share of natural gas rises) (EIA, 2003) . As seen from the data, Turkey is a small producer of oil. The share of oil is the largest, ranging from 46.3% in 1985 (Oǧulata, 2003) to 43 % in 2001 43 % in (EIA, 2003 . An historical summary of oil production and consumption in Turkey is shown in Table 2 . 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Around 90% of Turkey's oil supplies are imported, mainly from the Middle East and Russia (Demirbas, 2002b; Topçu and Ulengin, 2004) . Turkish imports from Saudi Arabia have declined in recent years, as Iraqi oil supplies have gradually increased. Turkey's port of Ceyhan is a major outlet for Iraqi oil exports.
The total oil reserve of Turkey is 931 million tons (Topçu and Ulengin, 2004) . However, share of indigenous production to meet the oil demand of Turkey is expected to be as 2 % in 2005 and 1 % in 2010 (Demirbas, 2002b) . Crude oil production in Turkey from 1998 to 2002 is shown in Figure 1 .
Turkey has proven reserves of approximately 229 million barrels of oil, most of which is in the Hakkari Basin in the southeast of Turkey. These fields consist of small deposits which have tended to become depleted over the years, increasing extraction costs. However, approximately 20 oil companies in Turkey have been exploring for new deposits in southern and southeastern Turkey, in the European provinces, and in the Black Sea shelf region (FEI, 2003) . The Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO)'s drilling activities in Turkey are depicted in Figure 2 . 
Oil transportation and trade
In the long-run, Turkish oil demand and imports are expected to resume steady growth. Around 90% of Turkey's oil supplies are imported, mainly from the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Syria), Libya and Russia. Turkey's port of Ceyhan is a major outlet for Iraqi oil exports, with optimal pipeline capacity from Iraq of about 1.5-1.6 million bbl/d, but oil flows have been halted since late 2003, following the outbreak of the Iraq war (EIA, 2003) . In 2002, 175,667 thousand barrels of oil was transported from Iraq (TPAO, 2003) . Crude oil production and imports by years is given in Table 3 . Source: TPAO, 2003 Turkey expects that much of its future oil will come from countries in central Asia, such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. TPAO is a partner in oil ventures in these countries.
Turkey has actively campaigned for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. In November 1999, Baku-Ceyhan pipeline route cooperation agreement was signed in Istanbul. Also, in March 2000, Azerbaijan reportedly reached a compromise agreement with Georgia on transit fees. One advantage which Baku-Ceyhan has over other potential options for Caspian oil transport is that Ceyhan can handle very large crude carries, while the ports of Supsa (Georgia) and Novorossiysk (Russia) are restricted to smaller LR-2 tankers, which can transit the Borporus. Another advantage for Ceyhan is that it can remain operable all year, compared to Novorossiysk, which is closed up to 2 months per year due to bad weather. Unfortunately for Turkey, the costs of constructing a Baku-Ceyhan pipeline are enormous: the Turkish government puts the price at $2 billion, while the Azerbaijan International Operating Company's (AIOC) estimates range far higher, at $3.5 billion. This expense, in itself, is a significant deterrent (Demirbas, 2002b) . 
Crude oil refining
Turkey has refining capacity of 719,275 bbl/d at 6 refineries. Refining and other downstream operations in Turkey are dominated by partly-state-owned company the Turkish Petroleum Refineries Corporation (TUPRAS), which has four main refining complexes: Batman in the southeast, Aliaga in Izmir, Izmit in Istanbul, and the Central Anatolian Refinery in Kirikkale. TUPRAS is planning a fifth refinery a $700-$800 million facility near Yarimca in western Turkey to be completed by 2007. TUPRAS has a modernization program designed to switch output at its refineries towards lighter products (EIA, 2003) . A summary of Turkey's oil refineries is shown in Table 4 . The other major refinery company in Turkey is Anadolu Tasfiyehanesi AS (ATAS), which is partly owned by ExxonMobil (51%), Shell (27%), BP Amoco (17%), and the Turkish company Marmara Petrol (5%) (FEI, 2003) .
Total installed refinery capacity is 32 Mtons/year. Distribution of oil products is carried out by the POAS state owned company and twelve domestic and foreign private companies, with Petrol Ofisi AS (POAS) holding a share of about 60 %. (Demirbas, 2001) . Table 5 shows crude oil refining capacity in 2002, and Table 6 shows crude oil processed in refineries in 1998-2002. 
TURKEY'S NATURAL GAS (NG) NECESSITY
Consumption of natural gas (NG) was recently made available in Turkey, and demand has since grown quickly. Turkey produces only a small amount of gas, and thus, NG imports have increased rapidly. The government is in the process of diversifying its gas suppliers. Several transmission pipelines are being considered to bring NG from Iran and the Caspian area, as well as to increase imports Russia. Domestic NG production is very small and almost all NG is imported. In 2001, NG production was around 312 million cubic meters (mcm), while imports were around 16.34 billion cubic meters (bcm) (MENR, 2004) . Current NG production in Turkey meets 1.9% of domestic consumption requirements. Major gas producers in Turkey include Arco, TPAO and Shell. NG production and consumption during 1995-2001 is given in Table 7 .
In 2001, NG is used in following sectors: electricity generation (68%), industry (13%), residential (18%), fertilizer (1%). NG demand projections are given in Table 8 . Source: Satana, 2002 Turkey's demand for NG is estimated to rise to 55 bcm by 2010 and 83 bcm by 2020 (MFA, 2003) . The share of NG in energy demand will jump from 17.6 % in 2000 (Oǧulata, 2003) to 37% in 2010 (Demirbas, 2001) .
Europe is Russia's primary export market, but Turkey has long been felt to have strong potential as an outlet for Russian gas. Currently Russia's fastest growing export market. Turkey is in a position to overtake France as Russia's third largest customer. Around 70% of current Turkish gas imports come from Russia via the trans-Balkan pipeline, with the rest 30% coming mainly from Algeria and Nigeria via liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers (Demirbas, 2002b; O_ulata, 2003) .
NG transportation and trade
The State Company BOTAS has a legal monopoly for important and transmitting NG. It owns the high-pressure gas pipelines, LNG import terminals and regasification plants. Domestic and foreign private companies may participate in urban distribution of NG.
On December 15, 1997, Russia and Turkey signed a 25 year deal under which the Russian gas company, Gazprom, would construct a new gas export pipeline to Turkey for delivery of more than 14.16 mcm of NG annually. The $2.7 billion, 758 mile "Blue Stream" dual pipeline would run from Izobilnoye in southern Russia to Dzhugba on the Black Sea, then under the Black sea for about 247 miles to the Turkish port of Samsun and on to Ankara.
As of mid-2000, Turkey and Russia had begun construction on above ground sections of the pipeline. In June 2000, Turkey's parliament ratified an annex protocol to the Blue Stream agreement, granting tax exemptions to investors in the project. Originally, Russian deliveries via the pipeline were expected to increase by 70.6 bcf (2 bcm) per year, with the pipeline reaching peak capacity of 565 bcf (16 bcm) per year in 2009 (EIA, 2002 .
This sharp downward revision in Turkey's projected NG demand could have significant repercussions, since Turkey already has signed contracts for far more NG than it is expected to need. To date, Turkey has signed deals for around 2 tcf (56.66 bcm) per year of NG imports beginning in 2005, more than double EIA's forecast for Turkish gas consumption in that year. Of this total, over 20% is already coming from Russia via Bulgaria, 17% from Iran, and 9% from Algeria and Nigeria combined as LNG. Turkey has one 3.18 mcm/year capacity LNG terminal, adjacent to the existing Marmara Ereglisi combined cycle gas turbine power station (EIA, 2003) . Table 9 shows NG and LNG supply contracts. Source: Satana, 2002 In February 2000, Turkey and Egypt signed a protocol concerning oil and gas issues that among other things declared their intention for constructing a gas pipeline under the Mediterranean Sea that would transport about 140 bcf (4 bcm) per year of NG from Egypt to Turkey. In March 2002, Turkey signed a $300 million deal with Greece to extend an Iranian NG pipeline to Greece. The pipeline will go 125 miles inside Turkey and cross the Dardanelles Straits into Greece. This will extend the pipeline from Karacabey in western Turkey to the city of Komotini in northeastern Greece. The pipeline is expected to carry 17.5 bcf (0,5 bcm) of gas per year, and could be completed by 2005 (FEI, 2003 .
The main NG pipeline projects of Turkey are: Iraq-Turkey NG pipeline project, Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe NG pipeline project, South Caucasian NG pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum NG pipeline) project, Egypt-Turkey NG pipeline project, Southern NG Transmission Line project, Eastern Anatolia NG pipeline project, Eastern Black Sea NG pipeline project, Western Black Sea NG pipeline project, Turkey-Greece NG pipeline project.
CONCLUSION
Foreign investors are showing a growing interest in the development of the energy sector in Turkey. It is very important that investors have the ability to finance energy sector projects through international financial markets.
Recently considerable attention has been focused on the energy resources and energy investigations in Turkey. The Turkish Government's investment demands in
